Introduction
The relationship between environmental standards and trade is at the forefront of globally at increasingly high levels, then developing countries may confront lower growth rates of exports in pollution-intensive industries. This paper empirically explores the link between trade and environmental standards by controlling for human capital as a technological variable. We also explicitly include a measure of the degree of enforcement of environmental regulations in the modeling. This enforcement mechanism is assumed to have a distinct role from environmental legislation in the analysis.
We study major pollution-intensive industries: metal mining, nonferrous metals, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and chemicals in 6 OECD and 18 non-OECD countries over the period 1994 to 1998. The analysis in large part follows the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model developed for econometric estimation by Tobey (1990) , using data on environmental stringency from Dasgupta et al. (2001) . This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical works on trade and environmental regulation. Section 3 discusses the common and distinct characteristics of the pollution-intensive industries. Section 4 reviews the existing cross-country measures of the stringency of environmental regulation. Section 5 presents the data and the analytical framework. Section 6 reports the results, and Section 7 analyzes the results and their implication on trade policy.
Trade and Environmental Regulation
Most studies that trace the link between trade and the stringency of an environmental standard explore either the industrial flight (pollution-haven) or industrial specialization hypothesis. The industrial flight hypothesis centers on investigating the factors that determine industry location and whether environmental regulations influence foreign direct investment decisions by firms. These studies are largely concerned with the possibility of flight by pollution-intensive industries and foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed to developing countries. The industrial specialization hypothesis is explored by examining whether lax environmental standards lead to specialization in pollution-intensive industries by creating greater accessibility for industries to air and water resources.
The empirical evidence in the industry flight literature is mixed. Pearson (1987) , Leonard (1988 ), Friedman, et al. (1992 , and Levinson (1996) found little or no evidence that environmental regulations have a significant impact on the investment or location decisions of foreign firms. Mani, Pargal and Huq (1997 ), Gray (1997 ), and Wheeler (2000 offer a counter-argument for this hypothesis. Levinson (1996) employed firm-level data on location choice and pollution abatement costs to assess the effect of state environmental regulations on new manufacturing plant locations in the U.S. Levinson indicates that the limited evidence of industry flight stems from firms that have plants in several states following the most stringent environmental regulations in all locations. Mani, Pargal and Huq's (1997) study of new plant locations in India indicate that environmental spending, presumably occurring as a result of more stringent regulation, is likely to be higher for more pollution-intensive industries. Gray (1997) note that firms want to locate where the markets are and that polluted areas may have shrinking markets, hence driving some firms away.
On the contrary, Lucas et al. (1990) and List and Co (1999) The majority of stud ies that examine industrial specialization have found little or no empirical support (Tobey, 1990; Low and Yeats, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Xu, 1999) . Tobey (1990) investigates whether domestic environmental regulations have an impact on international trade patterns in five pollution-intensive industries for 23 countries. He found no statistical significance of his environmental regulation measures on the net exports of these industries. Grossman and Krueger (1993) find no evidence that a comparative advantage is being created by lax environmental regulations in Mexico. Xu (1999) 's study on bilateral trade found no evidence that a country with stricter environmental standards lowering their total exports of pollution-intensive goods. Low and Yeats (1992) found that pollution-intensive industries account for a large and growing share of exports in the total manufacture of exports in some developing countries, and a decreasing share of exports in developed countries between 1965 and 1988. Grossman and Krueger argue that the difficulty in finding and supporting statistical evidence for the industrial specialization hypothesis lies in the fact that endowments such as physical and human capital, and investment remain dominant in determining a county's trade pattern.
On the contrary, Kalt (1988) finds that environmental regulations in the U.S.
have led to a sharp reduction in net manufacturing exports in 1977 presumably due to a shift of output mix toward the production of clean air and water, and away from pollution-intensive outputs. In contrast, Antweiler et al. (1998) suggests that trade changes the composition of national output in a more polluting way for capitalabundant countries. This implies that the developed countries have comparative advantage in producing pollution-intensive goods.
Pollution-Intensive Industries
Various definitions have been used for pollution-intensive industries in the empirical literature. Grossman and Krueger (1993) measure environmental intensity by using the ratio of pollution abatement costs to the total amount of value added to a specific U.S. industry. Low and Yeats (1992) , and Xu (1999) As there appears to be no definitive criteria yet adopted to define pollution intensive, we follow Tobey's definition of pollution-intensive industries in our analysis for comparison purposes. These five industries aggregate three-digit SITC industries in the following manner:
Metal Mining: SITC (Revision 1) 281, 283 Primary Nonferrous Metals 2 : 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 689 Pulp and Paper: 251, 641, 642 Primary Iron and Steel: 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678 Chemicals 3 : 512, 513, 514, 581 Information about the pollutant releases presented in the paper is available from the most recent TRI reporting notebook for the year of 1993. The TRI system contains data on total toxic emissions during production. In 1993, the total amount of releases and transfers of the Pulp and Paper industry was 218 million pounds of toxic chemicals, whereas the Chemicals industry released and transferred 2.5 billion pounds that accounted for 33 percent of all releases and transfers. Toxic chemical releases from the pulp and paper facility were approximately 550,000 pounds, i.e. five times as much as the mean amount of toxic chemical releases per facility across all of the industries in the TRI system. Table 3 shows that the maximum amount of pollution released (87 percent) by the Pulp and 4 Information on the Mining industry is derived from the Mineral Waste Releases and Environmental
Effects Summaries, since we do not have TRI reporting available for this industry.
Paper industry is emitted to the air, followed by approximately 10 percent of as water discharge.
A 
Measuring Environmental Standards
It is essential to choose a reliable measure of an environmental standard. List and Co (1999) use four different measures of the stringency of environmental regulation for the U.S. The first two measures estimate money spent by different agencies within a state to control air and water pollution and solid waste disposal. The third measure they use is firm-level pollution abatement operating expenditures relative to abating air and water pollution and solid waste disposal. The fourth measure is an index that combines local, state and federal government pollution abatement efforts with firmlevel abatement expenditures to assign a dollar-value ranking to each state. A higher value in the index implies more stringent environmental regulations. Tobey (1990) on the other hand, measures environmental stringency by using data from a 1976 UNCTAD survey. The degree of environmental stringency is measured from one to seven. Higher values imply more stringent regulations. Levinson (1996) includes six different measures of environmental stringency in his study. These measures are: (1) the Conservation Foundation index that measures each state's "effort to provide a quality environment for citizens" (Duerksen, 1983) ; (2) Due to its multi-dimensional property, the elements of this index can be disaggregated to construct variables that are useful for empirical analysis. The index is particularly useful for treating different aspects of environmental regulation separately, as they have a distinct, but interactive role in environmental regulation.
Moreover, the data allow us to disaggregate the indices into the sectors, so that we focus only on the industries that are relevant to the analysis, namely manufacturing industries.
The Econometric Model
In addition to the choices of reliable measures of an environmental standard, we attempt to make an improvement in the econometric model by explicitly incorporating the key problems that the studies reviewed above had found. In summary, they suggest that the effect of environmental standards on exports is difficult to statistically observe because: (1) the variation of exports due to environmental standards is much subtler than the variation due to the basic factors of production, and other traditional determinants of trade patterns, FDI and location choice (Tobey, 1990; Low and Yeats, 1992; Dean, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1993; and Mani, Pargal and Huq, 1997) ; (2) omitted variables such as input quality and technological level make it difficult to obtain a reliable parameter estimate (Nordström and Vaughan, 1999) ; and (3) differences in a community or country's control mechanism for environmental enforcement may affect the effectiveness of environmental regulation (Wheeler, 2000; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001 ).
The first point does not necessarily imply that the effect of an environmental standard is insignificant. It is rather problematic if the standard variable is highly correlated with the other regressors. Using instrumental variables for the standard variable will mitigate this problem. The second point will be handled by including variables that measure the quality of factor endowments, as they are considered to be one of the important factors to cause the omitted variable effects. The third point will be addressed by explicitly incorporating the structure in which control mechanisms for environmental enforcement interact with an environmental standard.
We revisit the industrial specialization hypothesis with particular consideration of the above issues. Our conceptual model follows the HeckscherOhlin-Vanek (HOV) model, which was first developed by Leamer (1984) . As commonly viewed in the industrial specialization literature, the environment is treated as a factor of production that is directly used for agricultural and industrial production as an input, or that the environment is degraded through air and water pollution as an end product of production processes. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, if it is extended in this context, suggests that countries that have lax environmental standards (thus, environmentally abundant) will, under a free trade regime, specialize in pollutionintensive goods.
We follow Tobey's cross-section multifactor HOV model, where multicountry data for environmental standards would fit well. We use the performance indices of countries in terms of environmental regulation developed by Dasgupta et al. (2001) . These indices are used to construct two key variables for environmental regulation-the scope of environmental legislation-and the control mechanism for environmental enforcement.
Our analysis employs trade data on pollution-intensive industries from 24
OECD and non-OECD countries. The five pollution-intensive industries presented in value of oil and gas production in U.S. dollars is used to measure oil endowment.
The variable schl follows the definition of the International Standard
Classification of Education on a net secondary school enrollment ratio. It is the ratio (in percent) of the number of children at the official school age (as defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school, to the population of the corresponding official school age. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and aims to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and human development, by offering more subject-or skill-oriented instruction, with more specialized teachers.
Data on capital, labor, and secondary school enrollment were obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Data on oil and gas production (in millions of barrels), and coal (in millions of short tons) were obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) database.
In our model, the state of legislation (leg) is constructed from the Dasgupta et al. (2001) dataset, and has been used as the measure of an environmental standard. It is measured by aggregating the scores on the scope of legislation enacted in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1 for the total scores on legislation). Similarly, the scores on the control mechanism for environmental enforcement (cm) are calculated by aggregating the scores on the control mechanism for environmental enforcement for the manufacturing sector.
As discussed earlier, the effect of legislation may differ according to the state of the control mechanism for environmental enforcement. As modeled in Smarzynska and Wei (2001) , an inclusion of a product term between the legislation and a control mechanism variable is intuitive. The product term allows a slope for the legislation variable to vary across countries, particularly between developed and developing countries.
In addition, unobserved differences between developed and developing countries can be controlled by using a slope dummy for developed ( [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] .
The instruments used for legislation are: (1) the number of memberships in environmental intergovernmental organizations (eionum); (2) (iucn), (2) government expenditure per capita (gov), and (3) the number of sectoral EIA guidelines (eia). 7 While the choice of these instrumental variables is based on the logical linkage and causal relationship, we also chose them such that they were not strongly correlated with other explanatory variables in Equation (1) and their counterpart instrumental equation (see Table 4 ).
The two instrumental equations are assumed to take a linear form: 
A Non-Linear Two-Stage Least Squares (NL2SLS) method is used to estimate equation (1) for the five pollution-intensive good exports. NL2SLS method is used because a product term makes the model structure non-linear and also to account for the presence of instrumental variables in the product term. Kelejian (1991) offers an approach that estimates a system of non-linear equations. He suggests estimating first the slope parameters equation by equation, then calculating the gradients of these equations with respect to the slope parameters, and evaluating them at the estimated values of these parameters. Then use these gradient vectors as instruments for the dependent variables.
We have one non-linear equation and two instrumental equations. Thus, we have three dependent (or endogenous) variables. Amemiya (1976) indicates that a different set of gradients can be used for each equation. This allows us to have a rather simple equation system. We use the original 6 and 3 instrumental variables for leg and cm, respectively. We also use the explanatory variables in Equation (1) as instruments for nex. This makes Equations (1), (2) and (3) unchanged. But it is necessary to include an additional equation that has the product term, leg cm, as the instrumental variable. It is because this term is also a gradient, and consists of two dependent (or endogenous) variables. We use all 9 of the instrumental variables for leg and cm, and the product terms that pair each of the 6 instrumental variables for leg and each of the 3 instrumental variables for cm, as they logically follow. The instrumental equations for leg, cm and the product term, are fitted in the first stage.
In the second stage, Equation (1) is estimated by replacing the corresponding variables with these fitted values. In this stage, we corrected for heteroscedasticity in Equation (1) by weighting the observations by the square root of the OLS estimated variances from the individual country. 8
Results
The results are reported in Table 5 Labor skills, as measured by the variable school, appear to have a positive significant relationship with net exports for all the industries, except for the Pulp and Paper industries, where it is insignificant. Negative coefficient estimates for the factor endowment variables, in some cases, are difficult to explain by real world observations. It is perhaps due to the high correlation among these variables. β β + for non-OECD are found to be negative and significant in all industries, except for the Pulp and Paper industry in non-OECD countries. The results regarding the legislation variable generally support the industrial specialization hypothesis.
More stringent environmental standards imply less net exports of pollution-intensive industries. This negative relationship is revealed once the control mechanism for environmental enforcement and the unobserved heterogeneous factors across countries are taken into account.
The total effect of legislation is, however, significantly different between OECD and non-OECD countries. As Table 5 shows, the estimated coefficient for 9 β is significant and negative in all cases. This means that environmental legislation has a more dramatic effect on net exports in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries. The role of a control mechanism for environmental enforcement in influencing the marginal effect of legislation on net exports is, however, not evident.
The estimated coefficient for the product term between leg and cm is insignificant in all industries. Unlike our prior expectation, the effect of legislation does not systematically vary with the control mechanism measure. Nevertheless, it is perhaps still useful to include this product term as a control variable in order to improve the estimate for the joint term 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
What do these findings suggest in regard to trade policy and multilateral disciplines on environmental protection? Our analysis suggests that environmental regulation can affect export competition. The negative relationship between the stringency of environmental standards and exports in the majority of industries examined may imply a possible trade-off between two goals-trade expansion and encouraging improvements in environmental standards. If developing countries do not place an emphasis on environmental quality, they are reluctant to tighten environmental standards. This could then result in a so-called "race-to-the-bottom" as with lack of international coordination pollution may become more concentrated in the developing countries.
If developed countries, instead, seek to harmonize environmental standards globally at high levels, through trade agreements, then developing countries may suffer from a greater loss in exports of the pollution-intensive products than a developed country. For example, suppose that all of the countries in our sample harmonize environmental standards at the most stringent level (Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland). Based on our estimated slope parameters, a non-OECD country will, on average, reduce exports of the five pollution-intensive products by US$ 2.6 million each year, or 0.37 percent of the average GNP of the non-OECD countries in our study. This represents 11 percent of annual exports of these products from the 24 studied countries. In contrast, an OECD country, on average, will reduce annual exports by US$ 0.62 million, or 0.019 percent of the average GNP of the OECD countries in our study. This is 2.5 percent of annual exports of these products from the 24 studied countries.
This illustrates that global harmonization of environmental standards reduce developing country exports of pollution-intensive goods more than exports from developed countries. Our findings suggest tighten environmental standards in developing countries gradually with transition periods could avoid rapid decline in net exports of pollution-intensive products. It is also important to raise public environmental awareness in developing countries so that the loss of export competitiveness in these products are placed within the context of improved environmental benefits.
The implications of our analysis are more complex, but remain relevant, for questions of trans-boundary pollution that form the core agenda of the new WTO negotiations. The results do indicate a relationship between standards and trade.
Developed countries are motivated to set a high global environmental standard in multilateral environmental agreements, as they tend to benefit more from reductions in trans-boundary pollution produced outside their borders. Some of the pollution generated by the industries studies here do cross national borders. International coordination to offset loss in export competitiveness shown here should be part of discussion at the WTO. Moreover, the targeting principle that suggests that addressing pollution emissions at the source through taxes and other direct domestic policy instruments-rather than through trade sanctions or limits on imports of goods by trading partners-remains the more rational policy prescription to suggest in this area, rather than embedding new obligations in trade agreements at the WTO. Overall process to control for waste water, disposal and pellet release.
2.36
Organic Chemical Sulfuric acid, Methanol and tert-butyl alcohol.
Overall process to control for catalysts, raw materials e.t.c. 1.53-2.89
Source: U.S. EPA (1995) and Tobey (1990) . Inside parentheses are standard errors. Notations "*", "**"and "***" signify significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels based on a two-tailed test, respectively. 
